全球化（globalization）一词，是一种概念，也是一种人类社会发展的现象过程。全球化目前有诸多定义，通常意义上的全球化是指全球联系不断增强，人类生活在全球规模的基础上发展及全球意识的崛起。国与国之间在政治、经济贸易上互相依存。全球化亦可以解释为世界的压缩和视全球为一个整体。二十世纪九十年代后，随着全球化势力对人类社会影响层面的扩张，已逐渐引起各国政治、教育、社会及文化等学科领域的重视，引发大规模的研究热潮。对于“全球化”的观感是好是坏，目前仍是见仁见智，例如全球化对于本土文化来说就是一把双刃剑，它也会使得本土文化的内涵与自我更新能力逐渐模糊与丧失。

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• 

  梁国勇：中美贸易战走向的四个关键维度

  梁国勇，全球化智库（CCG）特邀高级研究员、联合国贸发会议经济事务高级官员

  2018年5月8日
• 

  How Trump Led the U.S. and China to the Brink of a Trade War

  Chinese finance officials had high expectations entering the first major meeting with new American counterparts last summer. President Donald Trump had feted Chinese President Xi Jinping at his Mar-a-Lago resort a few months earlier, suggesting the two nations would enjoy warmer ties than his campaign-trail attacks had implied. Those hopes were dashed by Trump’s Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross nearly as soon as the July 19 talks began. Mnuchin told his visitors that he wouldn’t sign a traditional joint statement to end the meeting. Nor would there be a joint news conference, a ritual moment relished by the Chinese. Ross, a longstanding China hawk, proceeded to lecture the foreign delegation. The meeting ended in confusion, accelerating a downward spiral in economic ties with China. Now, as Mnuchin and Ross try to head off an all-out trade war, their talks in Beijing are made harder because of the Trump administration’s failure to nurture ties with China and the White House’s warring factions on economic policy. The consequences of the collapse of the formal economic dialog still reverberate. Communication between U.S. and Chinese officials was reduced to a trickle, culminating in Trump threatening last month to slap tariffs on as much as $150 billion in Chinese imports. “We are looking to change the discussion on trade,” Mnuchin said at the Milken Institute’s Global Conference in Los Angeles on Monday. “From the first meeting in Mar-a-Lago, President Trump has been very clear that the major issue was the trade imbalance, that we wanted to have reciprocal trade.” This account of how relations frayed between the world’s two largest economies is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former U.S. officials. Chinese officials did not respond to requests for comment. Partners in Trade China and Nafta nations are America’s largest trading partners What Trump Wants Mnuchin and Ross landed Thursday morning in Beijing and will meet Chinese officials in the afternoon and for dinner, the State Department said. Talks are set to resume Friday before the officials depart China’s capital in the evening. China’s government won’t accept any U.S. preconditions for negotiations such as abandoning its long-term advanced manufacturing ambitions or narrowing the trade gap by $100 billion, a senior government official, who asked not to be named, said late Wednesday. At a meeting in the last week, some senior advisers to the president indicated they weren’t sure what Trump would need to think he got a good trade deal, according to two people familiar with the matter. And another goal of the trip is for the U.S. to show China some respect for its help in pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Mnuchin said the administration is “very concerned about forced transfers of technology” and “forced joint ventures” for U.S. companies seeking to do business in China. “These are all the issues we will be discussing,” he said at the Milken conference. Chinese officials are open to discussing issues including technology transfers, widening access to China’s markets, increasing U.S. imports and Chinese industrial policy, said He Weiwen, a senior fellow  of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) in Beijing and a former Commerce Ministry official. They won’t bargain on narrowing Trump’s proposed tariffs or reducing the tariff rates, he said -- China has demanded the tariffs be withdrawn altogether. “China needs to see sincerity from the U.S.,” he said. “And only by withdrawing the 301 investigation and the $150 billion tariff threats can the U.S. show they are bona fide.” Trump “wants a lot from China,” said Wang Tao, chief China economist at UBS Group AG in Hong Kong. “It covers a very wide range and it is confusing.” Who Blinks? China’s overall trade and current account surpluses have fallen significantly as a percentage of its gross domestic product since 2007, economists say. China’s current account surplus declined from 9.9 percent of GDP in 2007 to 1.4 percent in 2017, according to the International Monetary Fund. And China correctly believes that the U.S. current account deficit, of which trade is the biggest part, reflects a persistently low savings rate relative to investment, said Jim O’Neill, former chief economist at Goldman Sachs Group. The New York Times reported Monday that the Chinese will reject two expected demands from the U.S. delegation: that they cut their trade surplus with the U.S. by $100 billion and curb government subsidies for advanced industries such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Cutting the Chinese trade surplus without raising the U.S. savings rate would simply shift the surplus to other countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, O’Neill said. And China won’t abandon its Made in China 2025 plan to subsidize advanced industries, said He, the former Commerce Ministry official. But some experts are skeptical China’s government will stand its ground. “If the U.S. pushes hard, the Chinese will blink,” said Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and the author of a newly published book, “Us Vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism.” “If they have to give an openness of markets they will,” he said. “The Chinese think they’re winning long-term as long as they keep stability.” The stakes could hardly be higher. Together, the U.S. and China account for more than half a trillion dollars in commerce. Companies from Apple Inc. to Ford Motor Co. rely substantially on Chinese suppliers, giving Beijing an additional pressure point to retaliate against U.S. tariffs. Trump’s predecessor, President Barack Obama, practiced what’s known as “strategic patience” with China, exerting little public pressure on the country to rapidly open its markets to foreign competition. Even Trump’s political opponents give him credit for trying a different approach. “One of the reasons that things are better is frankly that he has gotten a little tougher on China,” Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer of New York said Monday at the Milken conference. No Contacts Before the July 19 meeting, Mnuchin had held more than a dozen phone calls and meetings with Chinese officials. Afterward, there were few publicly announced meetings between Mnuchin and the Chinese. He met twice with then-outgoing People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan on the sidelines of major international summits. Chinese officials, accustomed to robust engagement with their U.S. counterparts, gradually grew more alarmed after the July meeting. Vice Premier Liu He made a trip to Washington in February with three requests for the Trump administration: Establish a new economic dialog, name a point person on China issues and hand over a specific list of economic demands. The U.S. did none of those things. Instead, Trump responded by imposing tariffs first on aluminum and steel imports -- the U.S. accuses China of dumping the metals into global markets, hurting domestic suppliers -- and then proposing levies on a list of more than 1,300 Chinese exports. Within the Trump administration, there was meanwhile internal confusion and rivalry over the approach to China. Ross had led U.S. efforts to secure trade concessions from China in the early months of Trump’s presidency. But since he failed to close a deal with the Chinese on steel imports, Mnuchin and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer have assumed more responsibility for the relationship. Inside the White House, Trump’s two closest economic advisers hold disparate views on trade. Larry Kudlow, director of the National Economic Council, is a free-trade advocate who has repeatedly described Trump’s tariffs as mere proposals rather than a certainty. White House trade adviser Peter Navarro is a hawk who in 2011 published a book titled “Death by China” that portrays the country as a military and economic enemy. “It’s good to have a diversity of opinion and when we go over there we will have one voice,” Mnuchin said in an interview with Bloomberg Television on Monday. A breakthrough by Mnuchin’s delegation, which also includes Navarro, Lighthizer and Kudlow, would soothe relations between the countries and calm financial markets that have been in turbulence over the prospect of a trade war. But the outcome is uncertain if the U.S. sticks to hard-line demands the Chinese won’t accept. Before they departed, Lighthizer tempered expectations. The U.S. and China could “spend the next year developing how we deal with each other over a period of time,” Lighthizer said, adding that the two countries are in the “early stages” of that process. Asked what success in his talks would look like, Mnuchin said in the Bloomberg Television interview: “You’ll know it when you see it.” ‘Escalation Mode’ “The risk is that we remain stuck in escalation mode and we don’t shift to negotiations and defining what we want,” said Michael Smart, managing director at Rock Creek Global Advisors and former trade counsel to Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee. “We simply need to map out a plan and need to bring our allies in. We can’t do this alone.” At the dawn of Trump’s presidency, the Chinese had reason for at least cautious optimism. Trump had attacked China on the campaign trail as an economic parasite on the U.S. But in one of his administration’s first official actions toward the country, the Treasury Department in April 2017 declined to accuse China of currency manipulation, keeping U.S. policy status quo. The Xi summit followed, where the two leaders bonded at Trump’s Palm Beach resort. China offered minor concessions welcomed by the Americans, allowing more U.S. beef imports and opening its financial sector to greater U.S. investment. It was the sort of incremental progress the formal Comprehensive Economic Dialogue was designed to encourage. But by July, Trump was dissatisfied. He didn’t want incremental advances. He wanted a wholesale overhaul of the relationship, with the goal of closing the U.S.’s $337 billion trade deficit with China -- by far the largest of any American trading partner, and a major irritant to the president. Frustrating Dialogue The economic dialog, meanwhile, had itself come to be regarded inside and outside of Treasury as a resource-intensive exercise heavy on style and ritual and light on accomplishments -- and not just by Trump’s political appointees. “There was definitely frustration that we weren’t always making progress,” said Nathan Sheets, chief economist for PGIM Fixed Income, who served as Treasury undersecretary for international affairs in the Obama administration until 2017. “In the years that I was at Treasury, I saw an increased concern about the lack of progress in certain areas in terms of Chinese economic reforms, particularly business climate issues in China.” But without the formal dialog, communications between U.S. and Chinese officials lack routine and coordination. Trump’s brash approach to negotiations, honed in the rough-and-tumble world of New York real estate, meanwhile clashes with Xi’s cautious strategy to open China to global market forces. Trump’s own trip to China in November was rich in ceremony; Xi flattered his guest with a banquet in the Forbidden City. The business deals the U.S. president announced, however, were almost entirely non-binding agreements that would take years to bear fruit, if ever. Any deal that Mnuchin and his delegation strikes may be just as underwhelming, U.S. trade experts worry -- and once Trump realizes it, a trade war could be unavoidable. From Bloomberg，2018-5-3

  2018年5月7日
• 

  丁一凡：贸易逆差？美国剪全世界羊毛时可不这么说

  丁一凡，全球化智库（CCG）特邀高级研究员，北京外国语大学亿阳讲席教授。

  2018年5月3日
• 

  He Weiwen: WTO Rules Based Talks the Only Solution to China-U.S. Trade Tensions

  He Weiwen, a senior fellow at Center for China and Globalization(CCG). Following weeks of trade tension between China and the US, US President Donald Trump said on April 24 that he will send a delegation headed by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and USTR Robert Lighthizer to Beijing for talks. The move immediately received a welcome response from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The escalation of China-US trade tension over the past weeks has caused great anxiety among the business community in both countries and the world at large. The USTR announcement of a 25% tariff on $50 billion of imports from China, based on its Section 301 investigation on Chinese practices on technology transfer, was met with a strong counter-measure from the Chinese government 13 hours later, with a 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of imports from the US. Also, China immediately referred the US 301 investigation and the tariffs to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO. President Trump then asked the USTR for an additional tariffs on $100 billion of imports from China. This only resulted in an even stronger resolution from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce to “fight to the finish”. The trade tension extended to the technology and investment areas when the USDOC on April 16 banned US companies from supplying chips to ZTE for 7 years, and the FCC suggested on April 19 a ban on buying Chinese telecom products. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department is busy finding a new legal basis to block Chinese high-tech M&A in the US. 301 Investigation and Tariffs Violate WTO Rules There have been complaints from US business on China’s practices in tech transfer, IPR protection, and equal competition. These have been the subject of bilateral dialogues and joint efforts by both governments for years. They could well be handled under the bilateral or WTO framework. The USTR Section 301 investigation report cited cases offered by the US China Business Council (USCBC), which comprises of the leading American multinationals operating in China. According to the USCBC China business environment survey 2017, 81% of member respondents said that they had no compulsory tech transfer problems in China, while 19% answered yes. Of this 19%, 67% said that the transfer requirement was from Chinese businesses, 33% said it was from the Chinese central government, and 25% said it was from the local government. The survey gave no concrete evidence on who forced which US companies to transfer what technology in what project. As a result, the Section 301 investigation report also failed to give any hard, concrete evidence. Even if we take that into account, it accounted for less than one fifth of total US companies, and the Chinese central government (no hard evidence here either) accounted for one third of that. Hence, it is a limited issue, not the representative of bilateral trade as a whole. We could easily have those issues resolved at the WTO. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the WTO covers issues of technology transfer, layout design of integrated circuits, patent, industrial design, and copyrights. It is based on recognition of all the international treaties under the World Industrial Property Organization (WIPO), and on three WTO principles: national treatment, most favored nation, and balanced protection. Hence, international rules and standards are there for practically all the US businesses. However, the USTR did not follow that path. Instead, he launched the Section 301 investigation, in violation of the WTO rules. Clause 23 of the WTO “Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes” stipulates that: “Members shall…not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred [and] shall make any such determination consistent with the findings of the panel of Appellate Body report”. It means that only the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism has the right to determine if China is in violation of relevant WTO rules. The US, as a leading member of the WTO, signed the Understanding. In 1998, USTR launched a Section 301 investigation on the EU. EU then turned to the WTO, and the US lost the case. The USTR then promised not to resort to unilateral Section 301 moves any more. Twenty years later, the USTR forgot its promise and made the same violation. Unilateral tariffs are banned under WTO rules, as tariff levels are set by multilateral negotiations, not by unilateral government decisions. Multilateral Trade Mechanism under Threat Having violated WTO rules, the USTR has gone further, forcing other countries to give the US “good bargains”. It used the steel and aluminum tariffs to this effect in KORUS renegotiation. South Korea agreed to increase the US automobile quota to South Korea to escape tariffs. If China makes this same mistake and negotiates with the US under pressure from tariffs and the Section 301 investigation, the unilateral violation would be legitimized, and the WTO rules would be useless. Then all the countries can do whatever they want to impose tariffs, or other restrictive measures. World trade would fall into chaos, creating significant risks in the world economy. In 1930, the US adopted the Smoot-Hawley Act to considerably raised tariff levels across the board, which hit an average of 53.2% in 1932, to protect the American jobs. Then Canada, the UK, and France retaliated with equal tariff hikes. As a result, US exports shrank by 66%, and imports shrank by 62% from 1929-1933, and world trade fell by 66%. The US unemployment rate shot up to 30%, the opposite of what the Act hoped to achieve. The USTR’s Section 301 investigation and tariffs have posed a major challenge to the authority and effectiveness of the multilateral trade mechanism established after the end of World War II. The current China-US trade tension is not only a bilateral showdown, still less a tech transfer issue, but a major struggle between unilateral protectionism and multilateral free trade. Tariff Measures Targeting Made in China 2025 A close look at the tariff checklist leads shows it has nothing to do with the Section 301 investigation which addresses technology transfer and IPR, not products. The list includes iron/nonalloy steel semi-finished products, central heating boilers, textile printing machinery, cooking stoves, dishwashing machines, and sowing machine needless. No one would believe that China needs to force tech transfer for those very low-end items. Further down the list, the main categories include nuclear reactors and parts, marine purpose internal combustion piston engines, and aircraft. Not a single one of these was covered in the Section 301 investigation report. However, they fall within the ten focal industries identified in the Made in China 2025 plan. Peter Navarro, Chairman of the National Trade Committee, abandoned all pretense when he said in a Bloomberg interview that “the target” of President Trump’s tariff order is certainly the focus industries in Made in China 2025. His remarks were later confirmed by the USTR. China, as a sovereign state, has its legal right to development. The Trump Administration could dispute specific measures within Made in China 2025, but not the Made in China plan itself. China never challenges President Trump’s Tax Act, because this is a domestic issue of the US. It would be naive to think that the moonshot tariffs and other tech restrictions could stop or slow down the Made in China 2025 plan. As the Chinese and American high-tech sectors are closely interrelated in the global supply chain which also spans Europe, Japan and the rest of Asia, any disruption will hit American high-tech companies as well. Apple draws 25% of its global net income from the greater China area, and the loss of the Chinese market could lead to 27,000 job losses and a stock market crash. Qualcomm even draws two thirds of its income from China. Its stock fell by 18% since the USTR announced the tariff measures. The seven leading American IT and telecom providers-HP, Dell, Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Cisco, and Unisys-got an average of 51% of their components from China during 2012-2017, according to a report requested by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Made in China 2025 will offer an even larger China market for world leading technology players. If they lose the China market, they can’t support the R&D in cutting edge technologies that’s critical to their future. Made in China 2025 is open to America and the rest of world. As stated by President Xi Jinping, China will further open up its manufacturing and services as soon as possible. The Chinese economy will grow by an aggregate of 50-60% over the next 8 years by 2025, meaning a tremendous new market, new industries, and new services, far outstripping the potential in any other part of the world. The Trump Administration should encourage the American business community ride on China’s coattails. WTO Rules-Based Talk the Only Solution The upcoming trade consultation is a step in the right direction. However, it must be based on WTO rules, and within WTO framework, not the Section 301 investigation and tariffs. President Trump has said that if no agreement is reached in the talks, the tariff measures will take effect by end of May as scheduled. In other words, the talk is under the shadow of tariffs. For President Trump, tariffs are a stick to use at the negotiation table, and trade war is a tool of trade policy. However, talking with China under a threat will not work. If the US tariff measures take effect, Chinese tariff measures will follow immediately, thus a trade war, a limited one, at least, will replace trade talks. The US trade team had better throw away any illusion that China would accept a moonshot agreement, giving up its Made in China 2025 plan. Only talks based on WTO rules can provide the common ground and common standard for both and lead to a balanced agreement. China and the US should strive for that end, which will be good for both countries, and for the whole world. China-US Focus， April 26, 2018

  2018年5月3日
• 

  魏建国：美国之举害人害己 中国企业当做好打一场硬仗的准备

  专家简介

  2018年4月25日