Abstract

U.S. policy toward China hardened during the second Obama Administration and has become more hostile since Donald Trump took power in Washington. Four factors may be causing this drastic change: (1) the shifting of power between the two countries in favor of China; (2) increased ideological differences between them; (3) conflicting economic interests; and (4) China being seen as a scapegoat in U.S. domestic politics. While a combination of the four factors can help explain the transformation of U.S. policy, the author argues that the changing behavior of China in the recent decade has been more influential in reshaping U.S. attitudes. The China–U.S. relationship may further deteriorate in the coming years, but observers are hopeful that the two giants can avoid violent confrontation.

Introduction

From the end of the Cold War in 1989 until the conclusion of the Obama Administration in 2016, the United States pursued a double-sided policy toward China. On one hand, the U.S. deepened and expanded its engagement with China, especially in the realms of trade, finance, education, technology, culture, and nontraditional security issues such as climate change and environment. On the other hand, constraining and preventive actions featured prominently in America’s strategy toward China in traditional security areas, as reflected in its responses to a number of security crises, including the striking tensions over the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996 following Taiwanese leader Lee Tung-hui’s U.S. visit, the bombing of China’s embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the crash of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter in the South China Sea in 2001. U.S. attitudes toward China were also temporarily hardened in response to what Americans referred to as “violations of human rights” in China.

A delicate balance between the two sides—cooperation and constraint—of America’s China policy since the end of the Cold War was intentionally maintained in Washington despite the ups and downs of China–U.S. relations during those years. The heyday of the relationship might arguably be the years of 2003–2005, which were praised in both Beijing and Washington as the “best period” in history for the bilateral relationship during which both accepted each other as “responsible stakeholders.” Soon after each of the aforementioned crises, the two countries were able to restore the momentum of their interaction.

“Qualitative change” of U.S. policy toward China

Radical changes have taken place in U.S.–China policy since December 2016 when Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. In reality, however, the downturn spiral of China–U.S. relations began to take shape during the first Obama Administration (2009–2012) and accelerated in his second term (2013–2016) (Wang and Hu 2019). The Obama Administration’s reaction to China’s proposal for establishing a “new type of major power relations” shifted from welcoming the idea to showing more hesitation and reservation. The issues of the East and South China Seas territorial disputes, bilateral trade deficit, and cybersecurity stood out in Washington’s list of its principal concerns regarding China, and these issues continue to be prominent in the relationship today (Wang and Wu 2014).

The drastic transformation of Washington’s China policy is striking in both rhetoric and action. In rhetoric, China has been defined as the main “strategic rival” and “competitor” of the United States in the “National Security Strategy” report and several other authoritative documents submitted by the Trump Administration (The White House 2017), as well as speeches delivered by leaders of the Trump Administration and the U.S. Congress. Vice President Michael Pence made two lengthy speeches, respectively, on October 4, 2018, and October 24, 2019, vehemently denouncing China’s domestic and foreign policies. It was very unusual for a U.S. vice president to make such a public statement targeting a foreign government. In both speeches, Vice President Pence referred to “many of Beijing’s policies most harmful to America’s interests and values, from China’s debt diplomacy and military expansionism; its repression of people of faith; construction of a surveillance state; and, of course, to China’s arsenal of policies inconsistent with free and fair trade, including tariffs, quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, and industrial subsidies” (The White House 2019). Pence also put pressure on American multinational corporations, which he said “have kowtowed to the lure of China’s money and markets by muzzling not only criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, but even affirmative expressions of American values” (The White House 2019). These American documents and announcements have repeatedly confirmed that the United States will engage in long-term, comprehensive strategic competition with China in a "whole-of-government" approach.

In action, the U.S. government has launched all-out confrontational activities against China, including initiating the trade war; undermining Chinese high-tech enterprises represented by Huawei Technologies, restricting bilateral educational, scientific and technological and cultural exchanges with China; stepping up “freedom of navigation” operations in the South China Sea; strengthening defense cooperation with Asia–Pacific countries such as Japan, India, and Australia aimed at China; designing and operating what Washington calls the strategy of “a free and open Indo-Pacific” (U.S. Department of Defense 2019); dispatching high-ranking officials for political and military exchanges with the Taiwan authorities; selling advanced weaponry to Taiwan; and supporting Hong Kong’s “peaceful demonstrations” and protests that Beijing censures. The U.S. Department of Justice created a “China initiative” task force to crack down on alleged espionage (U.S. Department of Justice 2019). In November 2019, President Trump signed the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019" passed by Congress. The enforcement of this Act may seriously hamper China’s interests.

Since the China–U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s, American pronouncements and actions with regard to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have never been so aggressively and blatantly negative. While some of the previous U.S. words and actions constituted “quantitative” changes in the U.S. approach, there is little doubt that the Trump Administration’s pronouncements and actions listed above mark a “qualitative” or fundamental change of America’s China policy from a more or less balanced one in which high pressure was offset by cooperation to an off-balance approach centered on rivalry and competition. Policy analysts in China should not underestimate the danger of this critical change with a false hope that it is only provisional and could be reversed.

Mr. Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia and a statesman well connected with both Beijing and Washington, pointed out in January 2019 that it was concluded in the United States in 2018 that China had become a strategic adversary, “and therefore the time had well and truly come for a fundamental adjustment in US national strategy.” Rudd further remarked soberly that “(t)he United States, including its political establishment, both Republican and Democrat, its national security establishment, the foreign and intelligence policy communities, as well as American business across most sectors of the economy, have concluded that China is not becoming more internationalist in its policy direction, but instead is becoming progressively more nationalist and mercantilist” (Rudd 2019).

Rudd’s observation was echoed by Demetri Sevastopulo in the Financial Times: “Support for this change in approach has a broad base in the U.S. Officials across the U.S. government have become significantly more hawkish towards China—over everything from human rights, politics and business to national security. At the same time, U.S. companies and academics who once acted as a buffer against the harshest views are now far less sanguine” (Sevastopulo 2019).

Causes of the change: four different perspectives

The deterioration of China–U.S. relations, as demonstrated by the negative shift in America’s approach to China, has been interpreted in many different ways. Four perspectives are often offered by observers.

The first perspective is essentially related to the contention of power and status. Many commentators in China, the United States, and elsewhere believe that the growth of China’s national wealth, military capabilities, and international influence poses a huge challenge to U.S. hegemony in the world. The “iron logic of power” predetermines America’s response. To maintain its primacy in global affairs that the United States has enjoyed for many decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, it will take whatever measures it can to “contain” China as long as China continues to enhance its power and status. This contention will be intensified regardless of what the PRC does internally and externally, whatever ideology or values it preserves, or whether it will turn out to be more democratic and pluralistic in its social system.

This perspective is held fundamentally by international relations specialists like Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago. Interestingly, Mearsheimer, along with the “hard realist school” thought he represents in observing international relations, appears to be more popular among Chinese intellectuals and students than among his readers and audiences in America. Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University likened strategic competition between China and the United Sates today to the “Thucydides’s Trap.” He quoted the judgment of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides on the cause of the Peloponnesian War: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Allison pointed out that China is a rising power, whereas the United States is an established power, and therefore, they might fall into this tragic trap as other states in history did (Allison 2017).

The second perspective focuses on the competition between political systems, values, and rules of the two countries. To some political liberals in the United States and mainstream Communist Party officials, ideological differences between the two bodies’ politic are irreconcilable. It is a popular view in American think tanks and government agencies that tightened political control, ideological indoctrination, and suppression of dissension by the Communist Party in recent years, as well as Beijing’s propaganda abroad of the “China model” constitute the main causes of America’s worries and apprehensions about China. People holding this view argue that the United States would welcome a more prosperous China should it embark on a path that is congruent with American values. Today, however, China’s model features what is called “state capitalism” that is in sharp contrast with America’s free market economy. The development path of China appeals to an increasing number of developing countries through its Belt and Road Initiative and other channels.

Though a political realist, Graham Allison also stresses that the major differences in cultural values and domestic politics between China and the United States are a key factor that might lead the two countries into the “Thucydides’s Trap.” Allison emphasizes that “America’s government was conceived as a democratic republic, whereas China’s—under the Qing emperors and Communist Party leaders—might best be characterized as responsive authoritarianism.” He concludes that “(c)ompeting conceptions of political legitimacy have become a sore point of US-China relations” (Graham Allison, p. 143). Some other Americans worry that the conflict between values represented by the “Chinese Dream,” which highlights loyalty to the state, and those represented by the “American Dream,” which underscores individualism, will expand into various fields. For example, they are worried that artificial intelligence and 5G technology developed by China may not only threaten the national security of the United States but also infringe on privacy and personal freedom of the American people.

The promotion of U.S. national interests, in particular economic interests, provides the third perspective to interpret the Americans’ high-handed policy toward China. Indeed, those Americans who are doing business with China are complaining about Chinese practices such as violation of intellectual property rights, trade barriers, opaque and unfair economic regulations, and inadequate market access. But their motivation is to make more profits in China rather than to disrupt China’s economic growth. President Donald Trump, in particular, is keen on reducing the trade deficit with China that has allegedly incurred growing losses for the United States. If the purchasing power of China declines, U.S. companies such as Boeing and Apple Inc. will lose a large portion of their markets. In the high-tech fields, the United States attempts to maintain its edge by sanctioning Huawei and other Chinese companies. In addition, the depiction of China being a formidable military threat has served the interests of the U.S. military–industrial complex, which can thus secure a larger order from Washington.

Looking into America’s domestic political landscape presents the fourth perspective. The United States has become embroiled in endless political squabbles at home, which are exacerbated by a widening gap between the rich and the poor, racial and ethnic tensions, debates on immigration, and the rise of populism and nationalism reinforcing each other. Political polarization is pulling the general public and social elites apart. Under such circumstances, President Trump is holding high the banner of “America first” and “make America great again” to mobilize his supporters and boost American morale. It becomes a convenient political weapon to blame other nations for America’s own problems. China, therefore, has become an easy target, a scapegoat for American failures in manufacturing and technological competitiveness. The incumbent U.S. government is wielding sanctions worldwide, and its “maximum pressure on China” is aimed at undermining the prestige and legacy of President Trump’s Democratic predecessor Barack Obama and other Democrats. Meanwhile, Democratic leaders like Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi are accusing the Trump Administration of ignoring China’s record of human rights and religious freedom.

Each of the four interpretations of the recent hardening of America’s China policy is rational in its own way. Obviously, any single-dimensional analysis would lose sight of the whole scene and be lopsided. Only through a comprehensive understanding of all four perspectives can we fully grasp the issue. However, it is the mutual reinforcement of the first and second dimensions, i.e., the fear of China’s rising power, especially its military prowess and technological edge, and the concern about Beijing’s fortification of the Communist Party’s reign over the economy and society, that are crucial in shaping U.S. hostilities toward China. In other words, the combination of China’s increased capabilities and its intent to use them against American political values make Chinese behavior no longer tolerable to Americans.

Traditionally, the “realist school” of American strategic thinking, usually represented by the Republicans who stress national economic and security interests, is balanced by the “liberalist school,” more often upheld by the Democrats who highlight U.S. ideals. Now that China is regarded as adamantly challenging both U.S. interests and values, the conservatives and the liberals tend to be coordinating with each other to cope with China. The recent American uproars about Beijing’s policies toward Xinjiang and Hong Kong indicate that even without U.S. interests being challenged, Americans may still do harm to Beijing. Meanwhile, the simple fact that China continues to gain more material power may not necessarily generate a strong U.S. reaction. To this extent, the second perspective as discussed above may cast the darkest shadow over U.S. policy toward China. The third perspective, focusing on economic interests, and the fourth perspective, looking into American domestic politics, are important variables, but they are not vital and constant in influencing the overall U.S. attitude toward China.

China as a decisive factor

The Chinese saying, “one palm alone cannot clap,” is matched by the English proverb, “it takes two to tango.” The simple and clear fact in the China–U.S. relationship today is that China, with its growing power and expanding influence, is playing an increasingly important role.

Historically, when China was much weaker than the United States, it was, more often than not, mainly the changes inside China that shaped the contour of the bilateral relationship. The most salient proof of this paradox was seen in the dramatic transformation of China after the Communist Party took power in 1949. China then adopted the socialist system on the domestic front and leaned to the Soviet Union in foreign affairs. In response, the U.S. carried out a hostile policy toward the PRC marked by military containment, diplomatic isolation, and economic blockade. In another case, despite the thaw of China–U.S. relations in the early 1970s, it was not until China’s embarking on reform and opening after 1978 that the two nations began to establish comprehensive political, economic, and security cooperation and humanity exchanges. Taking a broader view, the United States is more of a constant, whereas China is more of a variable, in the relationship. In other words, the major shifts in China’s domestic politics could make a direct impact on, or even turn the tide of, the China–U.S. relationship, but U.S. domestic politics has not played such a role.

Now, once more, it is mainly China’s power and behavior that cause a shift in the bilateral ties. The Americans are alarmed by China’s expanding global influence exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, its reinforcement of the role of the state in economy and society, as well as the amalgamation of the Communist Party leadership and its ideology. The current trade friction is only a reflection of the deep-rooted and growing divide in political values, power structures, and national goals between the two giants.

A number of American analysts point to the changes in China and its policies as the decisive factor that precipitated the shift in U.S. policy. For example, Demetri Sevastopulo argued in the Financial Times that it was China’s introduction of a series of aggressive initiatives aimed at expanding China’s political and economic clout on a global scale, as well as its new industrial programs and new devices to solidify the Communist Party’s stronghold at home, that triggered a sharp and startling response from the United States (Sevastopulo 2019). Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, two former senior U.S. officials, deplored the failures of Americans either to “mold China to the United States’ liking” or even to correctly predict China’s trajectory. They noted that “China has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process,” and concluded that “that reality warrants a clear-eyed rethinking of the United States’ approach to China” (Campbell and Ratner 2018).

Noting the role of China in shaping U.S. perceptions and behavior about China, one may find that a “qualitative change” in America’s China policy does not necessarily result in a fundamental change in their bilateral relationship. Much depends on what the PRC leadership thinks and does. To be sure, the response from Chinese media—both official and social media—to America’s recent rhetoric and actions is full of indignation, disproval, and determination to retaliate. But thus far, Beijing has not yet officially acknowledged the drastic transformation of U.S. policy toward China, or has it in any official statement redefined its policy toward the United States. President Xi Jinping has emphasized that “the two countries have a thousand reasons to grow the relationship and none whatsoever to wreck it” (Wang 2019). State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi recognized in September 2019 that “China-US relations have once again come to a crossroads.” He noticed that “some people are using every means to depict China as a major adversary, marketing their prophecy that the relationship is doomed to fall into the Thucydides Trap or the Clash of Civilizations Trap, and they even clamor for a full ‘decoupling’ with China.” However, Wang Yi called for the two countries to “jointly advance the China-US relationship based on coordination, cooperation and stability” (Wang 2019). Faced with the maximum pressure from the United States, Ren Zhengfei, CEO of Huawei Technologies, said adamantly, “we are diametrically opposed to populism and narrow nationalism. Economic globalization requires cooperation and win–win.” (see e.g., Ren 2019).

From Beijing’s point of view, everything that the Chinese leadership has done, both domestically and internationally, has been completely justified, as it serves the long-term goal of preserving the Communist Party’s rule, which in turn serves the interest of the whole Chinese nation. On one hand, the consistency of China’s policy toward the United States, unperturbed by what the Americans have said and done, is an important stabilizing factor, as this policy would not seek to rock the boat of the relationship by carrying out a tit-for-tat strategy. On the other hand, it also means that Beijing is not ready to change its behavior which has been tenacious in the last few years, including those practices the Americans deprecate. In other words, Beijing is not expected to make major concessions to Washington. Instead, it hopes that American policymakers will eventually change course when they fail to pay the price of confronting China.

To China’s political elites, the United States, since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, has pursued the goals of challenging the legitimacy of Communist Party leadership, undermining China’s social stability, and supporting separatist forces. In recent years, the U.S. has stepped up its efforts to sabotage the Chinese government, following their sinister plans to stage “Arab spring” or “color revolutions” in the Middle East and former socialist countries. In the eyes of those Chinese who harbor deep distrust of U.S. intentions, the trade war and other anti-China activities are driven by a grand strategy to derail China’s road to socialism and safeguard Western values. This perception is deep-rooted and will not change in the foreseeable future.

Hopes to avoid catastrophe

The United States has now identified China as a major external threat, while its bonds with other countries are debilitated. China seems unruffled in its march toward becoming a global game-changer defiant against Western values, while consolidating the Communist Party rule. In the foreseeable future, the qualitative change in the United States’ China policy, characterized by cavalier pressure and constraint, is most likely to persist, and its implications may penetrate even more deeply into America’s internal affairs and broadly in its foreign relations. If China insists on its path of ideologically driven growth and political structure, the bilateral relationship may experience a significant transformation, allowing people to see the essence of the China–U.S. relationship more clearly, belying its entire complicity and ambiguity. A tentative “trade deal” is possible, but further deterioration in the overall relationship is on the horizon. Therefore, what are the hopes for avoiding the worst-case scenario that would bring the two nations into a violent conflict?

Every cloud has a silver lining. Once increased tariffs on both China and America lead to substantial losses, American companies and economic officials will discover that damages to production chains and departure from the Chinese market are not worth the cost. They will have to reevaluate the consequences of trade frictions and make readjustments. Thomas Friedman, a distinguished columnist of The New York Times, was alarmed by the bad omen of possible economic and technological decoupling between the United States and China. In June 2019, he proposed that a summit between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping should take place as soon as possible to ease the tensions, supposing that, “(o)ur goal should be to move China toward global best practices on all these issues, not to isolate it and create a bifurcated world economy, internet and technology market” (Friedman 2019).

Recent public opinions in the United States have grown unfavorable toward China. However, the foundation of U.S.–China relations built up over the past 40 years since the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations will not easily break down. Even in the current atmosphere, many U.S. state and local governments as well as enterprises remain enthusiastic about expanding their economic engagement with China. In addition, numerous American strategists, diplomats, analysts, and scholars are still trying to maintain close communication with their Chinese counterparts, although some of them are understandably reticent in public due to the present strains in U.S.–China ties. On the part of Washington’s policymakers, Vice President Pence in his second speech on China, given on October 24, 2019, reaffirmed the “hawkish” line of the Trump Administration’s China policy. He nonetheless softened the line a little bit by stating that “(w)e are not seeking to contain China’s development. We want a constructive relationship with China’s leaders, like we have enjoyed for generations with China’s people.” Pence went further to deny the Trump Administration’s plans to “decouple” from China, but insisted that the engagement should be “in a manner consistent with fairness, mutual respect, and the international rules of commerce” (The White House 2019).

A lot of statesmen and strategists around the globe have foreseen the disaster that a China–U.S. strategic confrontation might bring to the world, and they are increasingly concerned. Christine Lagarde, then managing director of the International Monetary Fund, repeatedly warned that mutual tariffs between the two largest economies of the world would have a negative impact on the recovery of the global economy which was already unstable (Lawder 2019). Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked in his keynote speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2019 that “(t)he bottom line is that the U.S. and China need to work together, and with other countries too, to bring the global system up to date, and to not upend the system. To succeed in this, each must understand the other’s point of view, and reconcile each other’s interests” (Lee 2019). In practice, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and several other countries have already agreed to involve Huawei into their 5G network construction against the will of the United States. In March 2019, Italy became the first country in the Western world to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative, defying the opposition of the United States. Kevin Rudd, together with a number of former heads of the Western governments, openly expressed worries about the impact of the China–U.S. trade war: “Beyond trade, we are anxious about the wider strategic impact of any further decoupling of the Chinese and the American economies, particularly in technology and finance. So much of the world’s current prosperity and stability has rested on the connections between these two great countries—and the integration of their markets with the rest of the world. Such a decoupling would present a long-term threat to global peace and security (Rudd et al 2019)”.

Both China and America are undergoing dramatic domestic transformation, the direction of which will determine whether, and how, they can find a way to rehabilitate the links that have benefited the two countries over the last 40 years. China is changing more rapidly than America and will continue to change at its own pace and on its chosen path. To dodge a potential fatal confrontation, the two countries should engage each other in benign competition with the goal of facilitating satisfied and just societies and earning the respect of the rest of the world.